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This document provides responses and commentary to selected issues within the MHCLG’s 
consultation document Building a Safer Future, Proposals for reform of the building safety 
regulatory system – published June 2019.  
 
We are broadly in agreement with the findings of the Hackitt review. We are supportive of 
the government’s attempt to induce a culture change in the practices of the industry. 
 
In relation to the consultation, we have some general comments which we have made in 
response to specific questions. These are summarised as follows:  
1) The current functional requirements are not outcomes, and they do not naturally lead 
to a culture of so far as is reasonably practicable. We recommend that, if the 
government wish to induce a cultural change of this nature, the language of the 
functional requirements (or perhaps the Secretary of State’s view) should be updated 
to ensure that adequacy is defined in terms of so far as is reasonably practicable. 
However, we do not believe a so far as is reasonably practicable approach is 
necessarily desirable for building regulation because it would logically lead to social 
inequality in safety outcomes. 
2) The proposed dutyholder system may lead to the ‘disappearance’ of liability in cases 
where competent people are appointed to undertake tasks. We recommend that 
competent people should become co-signatories at each Gateway point. 
3) While Approved Inspectors are retained within the system, we are concerned that 
the government are at risk of creating a Building Safety Regulator that sounds like a 
single regulatory body, but in reality, may simply represent a re-brand of the existing 
alternative regulatory routes. 
4) We believe that the measures described regarding competence are largely symbolic 
and that the suggested approach is useful only in-so-far-as the legislative structure 
allows named individuals to be held to account under the law. 
 
Overall it is our view that much of the detail presented in the consultation is likely to 
turn out to be irrelevant unless legislation allows named individuals across the 
breadth and depth of the construction sector to be held to account and meaningfully 
sanctioned for their actions (or inactions). 
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Format of this Document  
Some of the questions in the consultation have relatively simple yes or no answers; many 
of the questions raise multiple complex issues in terms of the interaction of the regulatory 
system with technical and societal issues.  
We have largely avoided addressing the questions where we believe there are relatively 
simple yes or no answers. Instead we have focussed on questions where the nature of our 
response requires a discussion of background and context to each of the key issues.  
In addition, it is worth noting that we have limited our commentary to those areas where we 
feel that we have insight gained from our combined academic research, educational 
activities, and first-hand professional experience.  
Some of the questions are in areas that, while we may have opinions, we believe that our 
knowledge is insufficient to make a formal submission of evidence. Similarly, there are 
areas where we feel that other voices in the sector have a significantly stronger claim to 
authoritative knowledge. In these areas, we have refrained from making any comment.  
About the respondents 
Dr Angus Law. BRE Lecturer in Fire Safety Engineering at the University of Edinburgh. Dr 
Law graduated with a degree in Civil Engineering at the University of Edinburgh in 2007; he 
graduated with a PhD in Fire Safety Engineering from the University of Edinburgh in 2010. 
Dr Law worked as a Fire Engineer for Ove Arup and Partners in their Leeds office from 
2010-2014. He worked as a Lecturer at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, from 2014- 
2016, joining the University of Edinburgh in December 2016; Dr Law’s current position is 
therefore part funded by BRE Trust. Dr Law is a Chartered Fire Engineer (2014) with the 
Institution of Fire Engineers and Registered Professional Engineer Queensland (2019). 
Dr Graham Spinardi. Senior Lecturer in Engineering and Society at the University of 
Edinburgh. Ove Arup Foundation/Royal Academy of Engineering Senior Research Fellow in 
Integrating Technical and Social Aspects of Fire Safety Engineering and Expertise 2013-
2018. After a first degree in Ecological Science, he was awarded a PhD in the Sociology of 
Technology (The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology from Polaris to Trident) 
in 1988. Following a year at Stanford University, his subsequent research and teaching at 
the University of Edinburgh has dealt with issues of regulation, testing, technological ‘lock-
in’, and the role of politics and organisational interests in a wide range of technological 
areas.  
For further correspondence, please contact: 
 
Angus Law, Room 2.02B, AGB Building, King’s Buildings, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JL; or: angus.law@ed.ac.uk 
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Appended to this response to consultation, we have also included three research papers 
that we believe are centrally relevant to addressing the various issues associated with the 
Building Safety Programme’s current activities. We provide these in the hope that they can 
give some insight about the theoretical underpinnings that have informed our response to 
the key issues. 
 
These are as follows: 
 
• Beyond the Stable Door: Hackitt and the Future of Fire Safety Regulation in the UK. 
This paper provides an analysis of the Hackitt review and forms the basis for much 
of our response herein. This text has been accepted for publication in the journal Fire 
Safety Journal. 
• Post Construction Fire Safety Regulation in England: Shutting the Door Before the 
Horse has Bolted. This work was conducted prior the Hackitt review and provides an 
analysis of post construction fire safety regulation. It was published in the journal 
Policy and Practice in Health and Safety in April 2019. 
• A Credibility Problem: Test Results in Fire Engineering. This work analyses the use 
of tests (and specifically large-scale cladding tests) in fire safety engineering. This 
paper will be presented at the Australia Fire and Emergency Services Advisory 
Committee Conference 2019. 
Academic Freedom 
The authors are responding as individuals and exercising our academic freedom in 
accordance with Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016.  
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Q 1.2 How can we provide clarity in the regulatory framework to ensure fire safety 
risks are managed holistically in multi-occupied residential buildings?  
It is not self-evident that the current functional requirements satisfy Hackitt’s 
recommendation that an outcomes-based system should define the ‘outcome or 
performance level to be achieved’ or that ‘the new regulatory framework should require 
industry and regulators to agree solutions which reduce risk “so far as is reasonably 
practicable”’. 
 
For example, in relation to B4 (that the external walls of the building shall adequately resist 
the spread of fire) there is no specific outcome expressed other than adequacy. The 
adequacy (or otherwise) of measures to resist spread of the fire on the external walls of the 
building can be judged only in the context of the overall fire strategy of the building. Taken 
alone, B4 (or any of the other functional requirements) does not, therefore, define an 
outcome.  
 
To provide clarity in the regulatory framework that is consistent with Hackitt’s desire for an 
outcomes-based system and that encourages a culture of so far as is reasonably 
practicable, the functional requirements may need to be re-framed in the language of so far 
as is reasonably practicable. For example, an outcome in relation to B4 might be expressed 
as: 
 
The external walls of the building shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, resist the spread 
of fire over the walls and from one building to another. 
 
An alternative approach would be to reformulate the functional requirements around the 
health and safety outcomes for affected individuals. For example, in relation to occupants:  
 
So far as is reasonably practicable, no occupant should be affected by the fire, smoke or 
the structural failure of any component of the building. 
 
A further alternative would be for the Secretary of State’s view (in updated guidance) to be 
that adequacy is achieved only when risk is reduced so far is as reasonably practicable.  
 
In making any changes it is also worth noting that the principle of so far as is reasonably 
practicable introduces the potential for inequality of safety outcomes1 across the built 
environment. It would presumably be an unintended consequence of this cultural change 
that those with fewer financial resources obtain lower levels of building safety – because 
this legislative approach would in principle require those with greater financial resources to 
spend more on safety. 
 
Answer: If the government is actually seeking a culture of so far as is reasonably 
practicable with respect to building and fire safety, then this language should be 
embedded within the legislative requirements. 
                                            
1 We owe this insight to a conversation with Neal Butterworth. 
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Q 2.4 Do you agree with the approach outlined above, that we should use 
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM) as a model 
for developing dutyholder responsibilities under building regulations? Please 
support your view.  
We are supportive of named people taking responsibility and being accountable. 
 
However, while this proposal is presented as analogous to CDM, there are also strong 
parallels with the regulatory approach of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. 
The RRO has been demonstrably ineffective in adequately regulating the risks and (as 
noted in the consultation) is now subject to its own consultation. 
 
We have analysed the proposed system, and believe that there is a potential omission that 
will allow all parties to avoid being held accountable for activities that do not achieve the 
required standard. 
 
Firstly (for example) consider a dutyholder who recognises that they need to appoint a 
competent fire engineer. They would: 
1) recognise that they need to appoint a competent person;  
2) find a fire engineer, and then check that: 
a. the engineer has been accredited by an institution; and 
b. the institution is (either directly or indirectly) on the Government Oversight 
Body (GOB) signposting list. 
 
The route by which the dutyholder would assure themselves that the individual has 
adequate competence is illustrated in Figure 1. If this approach were to be taken, then a 
dutyholder would likely argue that they had discharged their duties in accordance with 
Paragraph 62.d. of the consultation document. 
 
However, if the fire engineer’s activity was not of the appropriate standard (or resulted in a 
building that did not achieve the required outcome), the proposed system does not explicitly 
allow legal accountability for responsibility for this error to be passed down to the fire 
engineer. The dutyholder would simply blame the GOB for inappropriate signposting; the 
GOB could blame Engineering Council for accrediting the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE); 
Engineering Council would blame IFE for accrediting such an individual; and IFE would 
then have to determine whether disciplinary action could be taken. 
 
Therefore, while the fire engineer’s inappropriate activity might not be without consequence 
(e.g. they could lose their accreditation), they could not be found guilty using any of the 
legal sanctions that are proposed with respect to the duty holder. The accountability and 
liability that has been created by the new regulatory framework has thus ‘disappeared’ – 
nobody would be held to account, as the liability would vanish into a multitude of 
committees and professional bodies. 
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Figure 1 Routes of appointment, and termination of liability with GOB. 
One solution to this could be to ensure that individuals who have taken responsibility for 
certain aspects of the design or construction are specifically named in the Gateway 
Documentation. For example, it is proposed on Page 143 of the consultation that Principal 
Designers should ‘Co-sign a declaration of compliance confirming that, to the best of  
their knowledge the building complies with building regulations and that an appropriate 
handover of information to the occupation dutyholder has taken place’. Similar text could be 
developed for designers and contractors. 
 
In cases where the dutyholder had discharged their duties to appoint an apparently 
competent person (by using the GOB list), this would allow designers and contractors to be 
held accountable under the legislation for activities that did not meet the requirements. 
 
Answer to Q2.4: Designers and contractors should be required to co-sign – as 
named professionals – at gateway points to ensure that accountability cannot 












Body Signposting  












Body Signposting  
Route to shift liability if activity is not appropriate: 
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Q 4.7 Are there any specific aspects of handover of digital building information that 
are currently unclear and that could be facilitated by clearer guidance? If yes, 
please provide details on the additional information you think should be 
clearer.  
Experience with Regulation 38 shows that even when handover of design information has 
occurred, this is usually not readily available to the current ‘responsible person’ and is rarely 
used to inform fire risk assessments. In the past this typically meant physical files being 
locked away with no one knowing of their existence, but making information digital is no 
guarantee that the information will not similarly be mislaid in future, especially when IT 
systems are changed, perhaps due to new ownership. To ensure that the ‘golden thread’ 
information is always available, and also to act as check on compliance, we recommend 
that this information should also be lodged with the Building Safety Regulator (and kept up 
to date as appropriate). 
Q 4.13 Do you agree that mandatory occurrence reporting should be based on the 
categories of fire and structural safety concern reports identified in the 
prescriptive list in paragraph 222? Please support your view.  
We are supportive of mandatory occurrence reporting on the basis that we believe this 
would drive an improvement in the culture within the industry. If people believe that 
occurrences will be reported and that they may be held to account for these, we expect that 
this will provide some incentive to undertake their activities in a more appropriate, ethical, 
and professional manner.  
 
We are supportive of the proposal to expand the scope and expertise of the CROSS; 
however, it is our view that the mandatory occurrence reporting should be directly to the 
Building Safety Regulator as proposed in the consultation document. It is our view that this 
would be indicative of the serious nature of the mandatory reporting, and allow CROSS to 
focus on the wider fire safety issues that have voluntarily been reported (noting that this 
does not exclude mandatory occurrences also being voluntarily reported to, and then 
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Q 6.2-7.4 Building Safety Regulator, Conflicts within the System, and Competence 
We are supportive of the proposal to establish a Building Safety Regulator. However, we 
have significant concerns with respect to the practicality of this proposal. It is possible that 
some of these concerns could be mitigated, but only if they are identified a-priori and acted 
upon.  
 
Our concerns relate to the degree to which any Building Safety Regulator would be free 
from conflicts of interest; the degree to which oversight of competence by the Building 
Safety Regulator would result in meaningful change; and the long term political will to 
sustain such an organisation (and retain competent people within it). 
Conflicts of Interest 
It is our observation that despite significant evidence of a conflict of interest created by the 
existence of Approved Inspectors, the Hackitt review and the consultation are suggesting 
that Approved Inspectors should be retained – with the only reasons for this being vague 
statements about ‘capacity’ and ‘expertise’. 
 
It is our observation that this may be the product of a conflict of interest with regard to the 
Construction Industry Council’s (CIC’s) role in the Industry Response Group (IRG). The 
CIC’s involvement with CICAIR leads to apparent conflict of interest concerning the role of 
Approved Inspectors within any future regulatory system. 
 
For outsiders, it is impossible to know whether and how the CIC’s conflict of interest has 
influenced the IRG’s advice to government and the resulting proposed policy response. 
However, it is our view that the widely perceived apparent conflict of interest is damaging to 
the credibility of (and ultimately public confidence in) the reformed regulatory system. 
 
We are concerned that while Approved Inspectors are retained within the system there will, 
in practice, always be a choice of regulator. We are concerned, therefore, that the proposed 
Building Safety Regulator sounds like a single regulatory body, but in reality, may simply 




Any progress with regard to improving competence within the industry is to be welcomed. 
With respect to conflicts of interest within the future regulator, the Competency Steering 
Group provides a useful case study of how this may work in practice. 
 
The manner in which the leadership of the competency working groups has been assigned 
means that the organisations who were notionally responsible for delivering adequate 
competence in the pre-Grenfell environment have now formulated a plan to address lack of 
competence in the post-Grenfell environment. This raises the obvious – and ironic – 
question of whether these organisations are willing, or indeed competent, to address the 
issues that have been diagnosed by Hackitt and described within the consultation. 
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Similarly, it cannot go unremarked that the committee chaired by the Director of Standards 
for British Standards recommended that the solution to the issue of competence is… a new 
British Standard. Irrespective of the rights or wrongs of this proposal, the appearance of 
conflict is remarkable. 
 
The leadership of many of the organisations involved in the process appears to recognise 
the need for culture change with regard to competence. However, it is our observation from 
our interactions with the fire safety community2 that, even in the post-Grenfell environment, 
there is a business as usual approach to the culture of competence. This was most 
strikingly put to us by one regulator recently as: ‘Culture change? What fucking culture 
change?’. 
 
Setting up an industry committee and establishing standards for competence may lead to 
improvements (from a low base) but there is no reason to expect that this will change the 
existing ‘compliance culture’ and bring about the shift towards the safety culture sought by 
Hackitt. It is wishful thinking to expect an industry with a history of cutting corners to change 
its culture as a whole; what is sorely needed is clearer individual responsibilities, backed up 
by effective sanctions. 
 
It is our view that competence will only be addressed via a two-step approach whereby (1) 
each necessary profession is protected under legislation; and (2) there is a legislative 
mandate is to use such professionals in the appropriate parts of the process. Whilst many 
interested voices across the industry have claimed that UK competition regulations might 
preclude such an approach, we view this as essentially analogous to Section 4 of The 
Reservoirs Act 1975. 
 
This approach is hinted at within the CSG’s proposal for a Government Oversight Body 
signposting list. However, the proposed approach lacks a legislative mandate. Without clear 
legal responsibility for named professionals throughout the system, it is our view that it will 
be no easier to hold individuals to account than it is in the current framework, and little or no 
change will occur. Without such a mandate the accredited professional would no doubt find 
themselves a victim of the pre-existing ‘race to the bottom’ described by Hackitt. 
 
Concerning Q7.1, and the proposal to create an overarching competence framework 
formalised as part of a suite of British Standards and Publicly Available 
Specifications, we are of the view that this proposal is largely symbolic. It is 
symbolic in that it demonstrates that industry believe the need to do something, but 
our view is that this approach is useful only in-so-far-as it could – if properly 
implemented via legislation and protected titles – allow named individuals to be held 
to account under the law.  
Political Will 
Our final concern regarding the Building Safety Regulator relates to the long term political 
will (and resources) to sustain such an organisation. The rapid growth of the Building Safety 
Programme serves as evidence of the magnitude of investment required simply to analyse 
an appropriate policy response to Grenfell – let alone establish a regulator capable of 
delivering the various activities in Paragraph 3.15. One of the key issues with fire safety is 
                                            
2 See also CROSS report 798 https://www.structural-safety.org/media/676688/cross-newsletter-55.pdf  
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that poor design and practice are only occasionally exposed, and rarely with such 
disastrous consequences as to have significant political ramifications. The often long gaps 
between disasters are thus likely to lead governments to question whether fire safety 
continues to need such funding.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that there is likely to be continuing ‘expertise asymmetry’ 
between those competent in building design and those charged with regulation of design. 
For example, fire safety engineers are increasingly making use of complex and opaque 
computational modelling, whose outputs are heavily dependent on user choices and 
competence, but which can only be interrogated by regulators who understand these 
models and the underlying science on which they are based. Without a substantial 
allocation of government funding it is unlikely to be possible for the Building Safety 
Regulator to develop and maintain the capacity to provide detailed oversight of outcomes-
based fire safety design solutions.  
 
The alternative to detailed oversight of design approval is that the regulatory system 
focusses more on checking who does this design work and less on what they do. As Hackitt 
concludes: ‘An outcomes-based framework requires people who are part of the system to 
be competent, to think for themselves rather than blindly following guidance, and to 
understand their responsibilities to deliver and maintain safety and integrity throughout the 
life cycle of a building’. This requirement (as discussed above) appears to have been 
addressed by ‘brigading’ it into the functions of the proposed Building Safety Regulator in 
the form of establishing a committee to oversee competence. However, the proposed 
committee is comprised of industry bodies that may have a conflict with respect to the 
regulation of their own activities. 
 
Regarding Q6.2, if the government is committed to supporting a Building Safety 
Regulator in the long term, then it must investigate how to create and retain a core 
group of competent individuals who are independent from the industry they are 
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We are broadly in agreement with the proposed regimen of enforcement and sanctions. 
However, as described above, it is important that to avoid liability ‘disappearing’ designers 
and contractors should also be included within the remit of the sanctions. 
 
While the sanctions outlined in Chapter 6 appear appropriate, we observe that other parts 
of the document appear to water down the absolute nature of some of the sanctions. For 
example, Chapter 6 states that ‘Carrying out work without having acquired the necessary 
permission by the building safety regulator to proceed through the gateway regime could 
lead to criminal offences’. This is reinforced by Paragraph 92 which identifies that Gateway 
2 will be a ‘hard stop’ before the regulator gives permission for construction to begin. 
 
However, paragraphs 94 and 95 appear to mitigate this by identifying that ‘waiting for 
information may delay developments from progressing’ and therefore proposes a ‘hard 
stop’ in stages (i.e. foundation superstructure). We would argue that the detail of this 
section appears to undermine the stated intent of the process.  
 
Furthermore, the proposed sanctions in relation to Q2.17-2.20 do not align well with a 
regulatory regime that is focused on improving competence. In order to drive a culture of 
change within the industry, we would argue that sanctions should be focused on individuals 
rather than projects. For example, if ‘work is carried out without approval’ then in addition to 
‘pulling down’ the work, this should have a significant negative impact also on the relevant 
dutyholder and the person who undertook the work. 
 
We would argue that since dutyholders are to be licensed under the proposed new 
UKAS/BSI scheme, such activities should automatically result in the temporary or 
permanent revocation of licence to practice, along with public disclosure of any sanctions 
set out, as is common in some other jurisdictions internationally. 
